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Summary
The idea that the effect of music on the human soul crucially affects matters of education
and politics is first found in Plato, with reference to Damon of Athens (5th century BCE).
On the basis of a late antique treatise by Aristides Quintilianus, which also refers to Damon,
the latter has been ascribed a full-fledged theory of musical ethos. The present contribution
critically evaluates the sources from Plato through Aristotle and up until Aristides, arguing
for a reading of Plato’s Republic that does not consider opinions onmusical details reflecting
the authorial voice, as well as for the absence in the classical era of a musical ethos theory
that was based on technical reasoning.
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BCE
Die Idee, dass die psychologische Wirkung der Musik auch für Fragen der Erziehung und
Politik entscheidend ist, findet sich zuerst bei Platon, mit Verweis auf Damon von Athen (5.
Jahrhundert v. Chr.). Auf Basis der Schrift des Aristeides Quintilianus, der ebenso auf Da-
mon zurückverweist, wurde dem Letzteren eine eigenständige Theorie des musikalischen
Ethos zugeschrieben. Im vorliegenden Beitrag werden die Quellen von Platon über Aristo-
teles bis zu Aristides einer kritischen Betrachtung unterzogen. Dabei wird für eine Lesart
von Platons Politeia plädiert, die Äußerungen der Dialogfiguren über musikalische Details
nicht automatisch mit der Autorenmeinung gleichsetzt. In der Klassischen Zeit finden sich
so keine Anhaltspunkte für eine Ethostheorie, die von technischen Überlegungen ausgeht.
Keywords: Damon; Platon; Ethoslehre; antike Musik; Aristides Kointilianos/Aristeides
Quintilianus; 4. Jh. v. Chr.
Ricardo Eichmann, Mark Howell, Graeme Lawson (eds.) | Music and Politics in the Ancient World |





Some of Damon’s research was regarding harmoniai, classifying and describ-
ing the various harmonies. He is credited by some scholars as the creator of the
hyper and hypo categories (as in Hypophrygian). He did the same with poetic
meter. Beyond this technical aspect his work also focused on the social and po-
litical consequences of music, through what came to be called the ethos theory.
He is the first one to study the effects of different types o[f] music on people’s
mood.1
This quotation from the planet’s most widely accessed source of opinion quite ade-
quately outlines a view on Damon of Athens that is, grosso modo, not uncommon even
among scholars specialising in ancient music.2 It entails quite a lot, attributing to Da-
mon not only a systematic description of musical structures, both in terms of pitch and
temporal organisation, but also a theory of musical ‘ethos’ that was detailed enough to
appear applicable in practice, to the end, potentially, of influencing people. Most promi-
nently, the idea that spawned our conference and the present volume is attributed to
him:
οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ κινοῦνται μουσικῆς τρόποι ἄνευ πολιτικῶν νόμων τῶν μεγίστων,
ὥς φησί τε Δάμων καὶ ἐγὼ πείθομαι.
Styles of music are never changed without changing the most essential political
rules, as Damon says and I agree.3
And yet, once we access the sources with the critical eye of the philologist and the his-
torian, interpreting references within their proper context and with a sensibility to the
texts’ respective agendas as well, Damon becomes increasingly evasive. In my contribu-
tion Iwill give an account of the ground onwhich a commonunderstanding ofDamon’s
ethos theory is built, and reconsider the stability of the various assumptions on which
it rests. Our concern will be with surprisingly few authors. Central in all respects is
Plato, firstly because he is the major source anyway, then because our image of Damon
has come to partake in the supreme philosopher’s authority, and finally also because the
later texts we are going to consider will serve to explain Plato’s method, or are influenced
1 Wikipedia, s. v. Damon (ancient Greek musicol-
ogist), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Damon_of_
Athens (visited on 19/07/2019).
2 Cf. Anderson 1955, 88 with no. 3 on previous opin-
ions, and 89 for his own: “in no other [Pre-Socratic]
thinker can one find comparably precise views,
views which in their coordinate form obviously rep-
resent a carefully elaborated theory of ethos.”
3 Plato, Republic 424c; translation Barker 1984, 140.
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by him, standing in the Platonic tradition. Among all the possible questions concern-
ing Damon – and there are many – we will be concerned only with his alleged theory of
musical ethos, which will necessarily lead us to an evaluation of Plato’s conceptions in
this respect: for, if the historicity of a Damonian theory of musical ethics is called into
question, Plato can no longer be assumed to have approved of it.
Apart from the above quotation that evidently links musical change to political
change – or, more exactly, political change to musical change, since it is the political
dangers of musical innovation that are at stake here4 – three notions are very commonly
found: (1) that Plato associates musical expertise quite generally with Damon; (2) that
he attributes to him the ethical evaluation of music; and (3) that Plato uses Damon’s
teachings as a basis for the musical politics of his ideal state, and Damon as a convenient
point of reference, which spares him the trouble of detailing technical minutiae. All this
is mostly inferred from the text of the Republic.
Some details are often assumed to be filled in by a late antique musical writer, Aris-
tides Quintilianus, who mentions Damon once in connection with ancient scales (har-
moníai) “handed down by him”; these scales are almost certainly identical to a set which
Aristides had previously specified as ones having being used already by “the most an-
cient”, and as those that Plato had in mind when referring to various harmoníai in the
Republic.5 Damon’s name, at any rate, occurs in the context of ‘ethical’ evaluation of
scales by means of characteristics of their constituent notes, so it has been inferred that
this was Damon’s approach.6 From all this derives what we might call the maximal as-
sumption of an ancient theory of musical ethos, underlying also the initial quotation: a
detailed and systematic evaluation of musical structures also in respect of their ethical
or psychological effects, both rhythmical and melodic, created in the mid-5th century
BCE by Damon of Athens, largely accepted and presupposed by Plato, though its details
can only be gleaned from Aristides’ account many centuries later. Several constituent
parts of this construction, however, have been assessed critically by recent scholarship.
Let us re-evaluate their credentials.
1.1 Damon of Athens, Plato and musical ‘ethos’
First of all, there can be no reasonable doubt that Damon’s interests centred on music,
even if one could expect to benefit from discussion with him on any important topic,
4 At stake, that is, in Plato’s text; cf. Anderson 1955,
94: “Socrates’ meaning is plain; but possibly it
should be taken into consideration that these words,
once they are removed from the Platonic context,
do not necessarily constitute, either explicitly or im-
plicitly, any indictment of such musical change. It
might be argued that one thinks they do because of
Socrates’ strictures, which surround the quotation
and seem to echo it.”
5 Aristides Quintilianus 1.9, 18.5–19.10 Winnington-
Ingram; cf. e. g. West 1992, 247 with n. 81.
6 Cf. e. g. Schäfke 1937.
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and some deemed him the most sensible man of his generation at Athens.7 Since we
know him neither as a poet nor as a performer, his musical skills were evidently of a
theoretical sort; hence also his association with the ‘sophists’.8 That his ideas involved a
connection between music and politics seems clear from Plato as well, unless one enter-
tains the possibility that the details on Damon in Plato are largely fictional. However,
most scholars would assume that fiction was probably still sufficiently restricted by the
memory of the historical Damon, especially if a written work by him was circulating;9
so we ought not to be overly sceptical here. Anyway, that Damon believed in an associa-
tion betweenmusic and ethical values (beyondwhat was commonly assumed) is attested
otherwise.10
Apart from that, we are on a slippery ground. Aristides’ remark about harmoníai be-
ing handed down by Damon sounds reasonably confident. However, there must have
been at least one intermediate stage between ‘Damon’ and Aristides, if not more, and in
the course of this process it is at least possible that Aristides misunderstood his source,
misled by the association between those harmoníai and Plato’s Republic on the one hand,
and the reference to Damon as a source of musical information in the Republic, on the
other.11 At any rate, the single mention of Damon in Aristides’ three books On Music
hardly seems to warrant the view that the details of his ethical ascriptions were heavily
influenced by the teaching of the elusive Athenian intellectual, more than six centuries
7 Cf. Plutarch, Pericles 180d (ἀνδρῶν χαριέστατον οὐ
μόνον τὴν μουσικήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τἆλλα ὁπόσου βού-
λει ἄξιον συνδιατρίβειν τηλικούτοις νεανίσκοις –
note that this is Nicias speaking); Isocrates 15.235
(Δάμωνος τοῦ κατ’ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον φρονιμωτά-
του δόξαντος εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν).
8 Cf. Plutarch, Pericles 4; Anderson 1955; Lynch 2013.
9 But cf. Wallace 1991.
10 Philodemus, On Music 1.13, evidently resting on
a source other than Plato; μὴ μόνον ἀνδρε<ίαν
ἐμφαί>νεσθαι καὶ σω<φροσύνη>ν ἀλλὰ καὶ
δι<καιοσύνην> “[when making music, ought to] dis-
play not only manliness and moderation, but also
justice”, if not a purely rhetorical formula, might in-
dicate that a musical display by an educated young
nobleman was commonly expected to exhibit man-
liness and moderation, to which Damon added the
idea of justice.
11 I have argued that the specific form and extent of
the scales in question betray their origin in the con-
text of the development of modulating auloi (Hagel
2009a; Hagel 2009b, 379–393), at some point be-
tween the later 5th and earlier 4th centuries. From
our sources it appears unlikely that both detailed
and extensive information of that sort predating the
modulating tónoi systems would have survived even
into the later 4th century. If, as seems plausible,
Aristides’ ultimate source is a lost work from Aris-
toxenus’ hand (cf. Barker 2007, 45–48), we might
envisage a scenario where this author listed the ear-
liest available scale structures together with a brief
reference to Plato’s discussion, in this context men-
tioning also Damon. On the other hand, it is just
as conceivable that Aristides’ account accurately
reflects the historical view taken by Aristoxenus.
The modulating aulos is associated with Pronomus
(Pausanias 9.12.5; Athenaeus, Deipnosophists 631e),
whom one tradition made Alcibiades’ music teacher
(Duris of Samos, apud Athenaeus. 184d). Alcibiades,
in turn, in the dramatic setting of the (pseudo-)
Platonic Alcibiades 1 (118c), refers to Damon as a
prominent presence. Therefore it is clear that the
4th century would conceive of Pronomus and Da-
mon as contemporaries within the same Athenian
intellectual milieu. An account of Damon actually
‘inventing’ a musical mode, finally, would moreover
associate him closely with the concerns of instru-




earlier. On the contrary, I think that a close look at facts and at the text excludes such
speculation. Aristides introduces the concept of male and female (and intermediate)
qualities of individual notes, on the basis of the particular vowels used for these notes
in a kind of solmisation system (a system in which the individual notes are identified
with, and/or sung to, different syllables or vowels). This system is only found in Aristides
and another late antique source, the excerpts known as Bellermann’s Anonymi,12 which
fact would suffice to raise suspicion about attempts to date it back to the classical period.
Moreover, the idea of a solmisation system would be to encode musical structures in the
mind of the student, in a way that the phonetic shape of syllables automatically evokes
intervallic relations. Bellermann’s Anonymus throughout exemplifies the system using
diatonic scales, as were most common in the Roman period. The ancient ‘Damonian’
scales, however, are not diatonic.13 In principle, they are enharmonic, although now and
then exhibiting ‘irregular extra notes’ (if interpreted from the later standpoint), which
might be taken as diatonic alternatives. In connection with the solmisation system, this
gives rise to a couple of problems: firstly, it is by no means always clear how to treat the
irregularities, and therefore which characteristic to assign to which note. Secondly – and
more importantly – the idea of a solmisation system ceases to make any sense if applied
tomore than one genus: notes of identical designation have different pitches in different
genera, and therefore no fixed intervals would be assigned to specific sequences of vow-
els. In any case, it is even more than doubtful that such an analysis in terms of ‘similar’
notes in enharmonic and diatonic scales would have been possible in the 5th century,
as such an (artificial) attempt demands just the heptatonic regularity and symmetry of
the later Aristoxenian unification that these early scales so notoriously lack. All in all,
then, Aristides’ theory is especially ill-suited for the allegedly Damonian scales.
To be sure, Aristides himself does not envisage returning to these scales for his own
music-therapeutic project. After explaining the general idea he continues:
Ἐοίκασι γάρ, ὡς ἔφην, αἱ μὲν ἁρμονίαι τοῖς πλεονάζουσι διαστήμασιν ἢ τοῖς
περιέχουσι φθόγγοις, οὗτοι δὲ τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς κινήμασί τε καὶ παθήμασιν. ὅτι
γὰρ δι᾿ ὁμοιότητος οἱ φθόγγοι καὶ συνεχοῦς μελῳδίας πλάττουσί τε οὐκ ὂν
ἦθος ἔν τε παισὶ καὶ τοῖς ἤδη προβεβηκόσι καὶ ἐνδομυχοῦν ἐξάγουσιν, ἐδήλουν
καὶ οἱ περὶ Δάμωνα· ἐν γοῦν ταῖς ὑπ᾿ αὐτοῦ παραδεδομέναις ἁρμονίαις τῶν
φερομένων φθόγγων ὁτὲ μὲν τοὺς θήλεις, ὁτὲ δὲ τοὺς ἄρρενας ἔστιν εὑρεῖν
ἤτοι πλεονάζοντας ἢ ἐπ᾿ ἔλαττον ἢ οὐδ᾿ ὅλως παρειλημμένους, δῆλον ὡς κατὰ
τὸ ἦθος ψυχῆς ἑκάστης καὶ ἁρμονίας χρησιμευούσης.
12 Anonymi Bellermanni 9–10; 77; 86; 91–92.
13 Ancient scales, in the standard system known from
Aristoxenus (4th century BCE) on, come in three
‘kinds’ (genera): diatonic, consisting of tones and
semitones only; chromatic, dominated by semi-
tones and 1-tone intervals; enharmonic, set apart
by the use of quartertones and ditones. Fine tuning
accounted for various ‘shades’ of these.
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As I have said, the harmoníai resemble their frequent intervals or the noteswhich
bound them, and these resemble the movements and emotions of the soul. For,
the fact that it is through similarity and a continuous melody that the notes
form a character that does not yet exist, in children just as in older people,
as well as bring out one deeply hidden, was made clear by Damon’s circle as
well. At any rate, in the harmoníai handed down by him, one can sometimes
find that among the moving notes it is the female ones, and at other times, the
male ones that are frequent, or less so, or not adopted altogether, so that it is
obviously with regard to the character of each particular soul and harmonía that
they are used.14
Textual considerations support our line of reasoning. Firstly, although Aristides clearly
wants to convey the impression that his treatise stands in a tradition of musical lore
reaching back to Plato and Pythagoras, he by no means claims that he has drawn his
ideas from Damon. On the contrary, “as well” (καί) clearly indicates that he regards
Damon more as his colleague than his master: Damon’s scales are the earliest evidence
Aristides can come up with, and still, he finds his ideas supported by their structure.
How this really works out, we are not told, by the way, and therefore we are at a loss in
determining how to apply Aristides’ nice principles to the ‘irregular’ notes. Secondly,
his “at any rate” (γοῦν) appears to betray that Aristides had no direct information on the
principles underlying Damon’s supposed ethical teaching.15 It is only by inference from
the ancient scales that Aristides determines that they must have been either evaluated
or even construed by “Damon’s circle” according to principles similar to his own.
Anyway, the categorisation of all factors into female and male and intermediate
entirely permeates Aristides’ method, in a way that, if his characterisation of scales is
Damonian, the contents of his pedagogic-therapeutic second book seemingly would
have to depend on Damon wholesale. But nothing either in Plato or in any other refer-
ence to Damon associates him with a predilection for interpreting the world in terms of
gender polarity.16 All in all, Aristides certainly insinuates that Damon and others had
developed a systematic classification of musical ethos as simplistic as his own is, but he
was unable to adduce any proof for his assumption, up to the point of excusing himself
for not doing so right at the outset of his respective chapter:
14 Aristides Quintilianus 2.14; 80.23–81.3 Winnington-
Ingram.
15 Cf. Liddell, Scott and Jones 1996: “restrictive Parti-
cle with an inferential force, at least then […] freq.
in adducing an instance, or a fact giving rise to a
presumption […] at all events”.
16 Unless one counts the fact that the young lyre player
in the testimony recorded by Philodemus (cf. no. 9)
is expected to show both manliness and modera-




Καιρὸς δὲ λοιπὸν ἐξηγεῖσθαι ποῖα μὲν μέλη, ποῖοι δὲ ῥυθμοὶ καταρτύσουσι τὰ
τῆς φύσεως παθήματα. λέξω δὴ τὰ μὲν παλαιοῖς τισιν εἰρημένα, τὰ δὲ εἰσέτι
νῦν σιωπηθέντα οὔτ᾿ ἀγνωσίᾳ τῶν συγγραφέων οὔτε βασκανίᾳ· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ
οὐδ᾿ εἰπεῖν θέμις ἀνδρῶν πέρι φιλοσόφων μουσικῇ τετελεσμένων· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὰ
μὲν αὐτοῖς ἐν συγγράμμασι κατετάττετο, τὰ δ᾿ ἀπορρητότερα ταῖς πρὸς ἀλ-
λήλους ὁμιλίαις διεσῴζετο. αἰτία δ᾿ ἦν ἡ τῶν τότε περὶ τὰ κάλλιστα ὁρμή τε
καὶ φιλοχωρία· νυνὶ δὲ τοσαύτης ἐπιπολαζούσης (δεῖ γὰρ εὐφημεῖν) ἀφιλο-
μουσίας <ἆρ᾿> ἀγαπητὸν ἔσται τοῖς μετρίως ἐπιμελέσιν, εἰ βίβλῳ οὐ σαφές τι
περιεχούσῃ περιπέσοιεν.
It is now time to explain what kinds of melody and rhythm will discipline the
natural emotions. I shall set out what some ancient writers said, and also some
things which have not previously been discussed – not, however, because the
writers were ignorant or malicious. That would be a quite improper thing to
say of philosophers initiated in the mysteries of music. The fact is rather that
while they expounded some things in their writings, they reserved the more
esoteric secrets for their discussions with one another. The reason lay in the
enthusiastic affection of the men of those times for all that is finest. But now,
when indifference to music (to put it politely) is so widespread, we cannot ex-
pect people with only a mild interest in the subject to tolerate being faced with
a book in which not everything is explicitly spelled out.17
These statements are entirely consistent with the view that what Aristides took over from
“the ancient writers” was merely the general idea of musical ethos and its pedagogical
usage. As he expounds on no technical details beyond his simple gendering of notes
in the regular scale, this must be the “esoteric secrets” that could not be found in any
book so far. However, if we subtract this bit from Aristides’ system, nothing technical in
his work is left that might be associated with Damon. All the more we can understand
why Aristides had to adduce, desperately enough, the ‘Damonian’ scales as arguments
for Damon’s adherence to a paradigm similar to his own.
If Aristides had no access to a truly Damonian theory of musical ethos, this need not
exclude, of course, that Plato, who lived only a few decades after the time in question,
did possess such information. However, it has often been observed that his Republic con-
spicuously does not mention Damon in its discussion of harmoníai to be admitted to or
excluded from the ideal state. Instead, the average musical knowledge of Socrates’ dia-
logue partner Glaucon suffices to supply the general characteristics of individual ‘modes’.
Far from invoking a quasi-scientific ethos theory, therefore, Plato bases the results of this
17 Aristides Quintilianus 2.7; 65.10–21 Winnington-
Ingram; translation Barker 1989, 469.
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famous passage – the admission of Dorian and Phrygian only – on what he depicts as
entirely common notions.
Only when the argument turns to rhythms, and when both dialogue partners con-
fess their ignorance in this intricate matter, is the question deferred to later discussion
with Damon:
Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν, ἦν δ᾿ ἐγώ, καὶ μετὰ Δάμωνος βουλευσόμεθα, τίνες τε ἀνελευ-
θερίας καὶ ὕβρεως ἢ μανίας καὶ ἄλλης κακίας πρέπουσαι βάσεις, καὶ τίνας
τοῖς ἐναντίοις λειπτέον ῥυθμούς.
‘Then on these points we shall take advice from Damon,’ I said, ‘and ask him
whichmovements are suitable for illiberality, conceit, madness and other vices,
and which rhythms we should keep and assign to their opposites.’18
Here Damon seems indeed regarded as a specialist on rhythmical ethos, at least. But
not even that is absolutely beyond doubt, since it cannot be taken for granted that Da-
mon is envisaged to have dealt with the specific question before. Instead, he might be
conceived as a specialist confronted with a novel question belonging to his field – an
option that seems much less far-fetched when we recall the Socratic method of other
Platonic dialogues, explicitly spelled out in the Apology, which consists exactly in ques-
tioning ‘specialists’ (with the ‘unintended’ outcome of eventually exposing their igno-
rance). Nevertheless, in the sequel to the above quotation, Damon is depicted as not
only analysing rhythms, but passing judgement on them, although it is still not clear
whether this would have been done according to the criteria envisaged for the ideal state:
οἶμαι δέ με ἀκηκοέναι οὐ σαφῶς ἐνόπλιόν τέ τινα ὀνομάζοντος αὐτοῦ σύνθε-
τον καὶ δάκτυλον καὶ ἡρῷόν γε, οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως διακοσμοῦντος καὶ ἴσον ἄνω
καὶ κάτω τιθέντος, εἰς βραχύ τε καὶ μακρὸν γιγνόμενον, καί, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι,
ἴαμβον καί τιν᾿ ἄλλον τροχαῖον ὠνόμαζε, μήκη δὲ καὶ βραχύτητας προσῆπτε.
καὶ τούτων τισὶν οἶμαι τὰς ἀγωγὰς τοῦ ποδὸς αὐτὸν οὐχ ἧττον ψέγειν τε καὶ
ἐπαινεῖν ἢ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς αὐτούς – ἤτοι συναμφότερόν τι· οὐ γὰρ ἔχω λέγειν.
I think I have heard him not very clearly talking about one in armour, put
together, and a finger and, yes, a heroic one, somehow arraying them and mak-
ing up and down equal as it turned into short and long; and, I think, he talked
about an “iamb” and some other “trochee” and attached longs and shorts to
them. And of these, I think, he blamed and praised the conduct of the foot no
less than the rhythms themselves – or somehow both? I cannot tell.19
18 Plato, Republic 400b; translation Barker 1984, 134. 19 Plato, Republic 400c; translation Barker 1984, 134.
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It is perhaps surprising that this description of Damon in discussion or lecturing should
be characterised by such a considerable admixture of comic elements: not always easy to
render in translation, they cannot but signal irony.20 As a literary device, they entertain
the reader by combining bits and pieces of rhythmical theory out of their context, in
such a way that they appear nonsensical: e. g. the obvious paradox of “making up and
down equal”, whose precise sense as the definition of ‘equal rhythm’ the reader is ex-
pected to be familiar with. Apart from entertainment, however, we would not expect
Plato to mark Damon’s entry onto the stage as comic, were it not for a particular reason.
We need not pin it down – the true philosopher’s contempt for technicalities is a plau-
sible suggestion21 – but what we get is at least a clear signal that there is no Damonian
lore that in Plato’s eyes deserves untempered reverence. And, as regards the criteria that
inform Damon’s evaluation, the passage gives us not the slightest hint. Considering the
contrast to the comparative richness of detail (even if blurred) on rhythmical analysis on
a purely technical level, this absence would appear highly surprising if Damon had in
fact proceeded from technical analysis to ethical assessment systematically. On balance,
the text of the Republic does not support the notion of a fully fledged Damonian ethos
theory; indeed the contrary is true.
If Damon is now out of the game as a fictional as well as a historical authority on a
systematic theory of musical ethos, our quest narrows down to Plato himself. So, are the
conclusions about harmoníai reached in the Republic backed by – unwritten – system-
atic evaluation of their structures in the Academy (accompanied perhaps by analogous
teachings on rhythms, which are just not directly reflected in the Republic), because their
treatment would have required too long an excursion? Or, in other words, did Plato be-
lieve he had found (or inherited, at any rate) the recipe, by which to judge the ethical
value of music (apart from the lyrics)?
Again, the ironic treatment of rhythmical technicalities must caution us against
such an assumption, especially in combination with the complete absence of technical
criteria in the evaluation of modes, which appeared to be judged solely on the basis of
common conceptions (however, these too may be fictional).
Apart from that, any view on that question must needs depend on our view of the
Republic as philosophy expressed in a literary work. Plato has often been chided formany
things “he” says there; however, there is nothing there to prompt us to assume that any
one of the interlocutors is expressing the views of the dialogue’s author. In the case of
the ‘purgation of music’, the presented views are moreover qualified, and conspicuously
so, by the confession of Socrates, the protagonist, not to understand anything about the
subject, and the initial assertion of his dialogue partner, Glaucon, that he is unable to
20 Cf. Wallace 2005, 150: “with his customary dry hu-
mor”; also Anderson 1955, 91: “gentle parody”.
21 Cf. Anderson 1955, 91–96.
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answer the question, in spite of Socrates having addressed himhalf-ironically asmousikós,
‘educated’. The scene is therefore set for all kinds ofmisconceptions in a rough and brutal
attempt to identify proper and improper elements ofmusic culture.Moreover, the result
of the evaluation of harmoníai is puzzling enough, as Phrygian is admitted side-by-side
with Dorian. Aristotle, it is often said, already rebuked Plato for this obvious error.22
But neither was Plato that careless, nor would Aristotle have assumed him to be.
In fact, Aristotle, as Plato’s former student being admittedly in a better position than
we are, proved very well able to distinguish between the voice of Plato and those of his
literary figures, including Socrates. A glance at his manner of quoting Platonic texts in
his own Politics shows how naturally this distinction expressed itself.23 Whenever talking
about the Republic, Aristotle refrains from attributing the views found there to Plato,
even if that demanded amore complexmode of quotation (whichmanymodern studies
on Plato might benefit from imitating). Not that Plato was wrong about the Phrygian,
ὁ δ᾿ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης οὐ καλῶς τὴν φρυγιστὶ μόνην καταλείπει μετὰ
τῆς δωριστί.
but the ‘Socrates’ of the Republic is wrong to retain just the Phrygian along with
the Dorian. 24
Similarly, a little later on, Aristotle even relates the views of others in the same painstak-
ing manner:
διὸ καλῶς ἐπιτιμῶσι καὶ τοῦτο Σωκράτει τῶν περὶ τὴν μουσικήν τινες […]
For this reason some musical experts quite fairly find fault with Socrates […]25
As its author, Plato is named only where Aristotle refers to the Republic for the first time,
and here it becomes most conspicuous that the view in question is not quoted in Plato’s
name:
[…] ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος· ἐκεῖ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης φησὶ […]
[…] as in Plato’s Republic: for there Socrates says […]26
Most importantly, however, this manner of quotation is notmechanical.When referring
to the Laws, Plato’s second large work on the question of an ideal constitution, in which
22 Cf. e. g. Anderson 1955, 95: “Aristotle’s outspokenly
frank disagreement with Plato over the ethos of
Phrygian”.
23 Cf. Halliwell 2006, 200–202.
24 Aristotle, Politics 1342a; translation Barker 1984, 181.
25 Aristotle, Politics 1342a; translation Barker 1984, 181.
26 Aristotle, Politics 1261a; translation Barker 1984.
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much space is also devoted to music, Aristotle knows equally well that here it was more
or less Plato’s own ideas that he – at least in the specific case under scrutiny – put in the
mouth of the unnamed Athenian. Consequently, Aristotle does not hesitate to write
Πλάτων δὲ τοὺς Νόμους γράφων […] ᾤετο […]
But Plato, when writing the Laws, thought […]27
This distinction, in fact, would sufficiently explain the differences between the appar-
ently much more rigorist Republic and the comparatively more moderate Laws, both in
musical and in other matters, much better than the assumption of an intervening evolu-
tion in Plato’s thought. The Republic explores and exemplifies the philosophic quest for
the ideal state, in amost uncompromising way exactly for the sake of clearly demonstrat-
ing the method. The Laws, in contrast, are situated within and aiming at reality, with all
its practical uncertainties. The treatment of music exemplarily illustrates this difference.
In theRepublic, Socrates talks as if all necessary informationwere available to distinguish
‘good’ from ‘bad’ music. This results in simplistic decisions, rejecting instruments and
modes on the basis of superficial associations that – asmust have been clear to everybody
– would not do justice to actual musical reality. The details are accordingly marked by
irony and statements of ignorance, but all this is by no means meant to detract from
the very serious assertion: that music, with all its effects on human psychology, is a cru-
cial factor in the state, and ought therefore to be regulated, according to as scientific
an assessment of its ingredients as is possible. As a proxy for such a true understanding
of musical ethos, Plato introduces Glaucon’s questionable expertise and the anticipa-
tion of Damon’s professional support. Indeed, Plato was not so naïve as to believe in
a system like that of Aristides, which claims to determine the details of musical ethos.
Consequently, the Laws cannot base the necessary musical regulations on such a ‘true’
theory, which explains the absence of technical details there: in practice, the experience
and wisdom of aged citizens who have acquired the ability to assess what is appropriate
must substitute for it. Nevertheless Plato had not given up, in principle, his vision of a
true music theory: but he knew only too well how far any technical descriptions of his
time fell short of it – after all, even with all our modern advances in psychology and
neurology, we ourselves are still a long way away from achieving such a theory (and of
course, are much more aware about cultural conditioning). Thus we find him stating
the ideal basis of musical laws only as a potentiality:
ὥσθ᾿, ὅπερ ἔλεγον, εἰ δύναιτό τις ἑλεῖν αὐτῶν καὶ ὁπωσοῦν τὴν ὀρθότητα, θαρ-
ροῦντα χρὴ εἰς νόμον ἄγειν καὶ τάξιν αὐτά.
27 Aristotle, Politics 1266b; translation Barker 1984.
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Thus, as I said, if one could somehowgrasp the nature of correctness inmelodies,
one ought boldly to bring them under law and regulation.28
If Plato operated with simplistic ideas only as a temporary expedient, this does not mean
that such ideas had not been around otherwise. A text plausibly dating from Plato’s day,
preserved in the famous Hibeh Papyrus 1.13, quotes and argues against music theorists
who held that enharmonic music would render people manly, whereas chromatic music
would engender cowardice. Analogous ascriptions of various characteristics to genera or
modes appear in the sources over the centuries, which we need not treat here. Suffice it
to state that they are never based on technical arguments, and are partly contradictory,
thus evoking the ridicule of thinkers who did not subscribe to the idea.29 Thus it is
hardly possible to construe a consistent history of these ideas; at any rate, they appear
to rest on a purely impressionistic basis, governed by cultural connotations associated
with the appraised characteristics.
Throughout, however, themajor thinkers abstain from simplicity. Aristotle basically
reflects Plato’s approach, as he accepts that music does influence the character and the
soul as proven by daily, notably religious, experience:
[…] δεῖ μὴ μόνον τῆς κοινῆς ἡδονῆς μετέχειν ἀπ᾿ αὐτῆς, ἧς ἔχουσι πάντες
αἴσθησιν (ἔχει γὰρ ἡ μουσική τιν᾿ ἡδονὴν φυσικήν, διὸ πάσαις ἡλικίαις καὶ
πᾶσιν ἤθεσιν ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ἐστι προσφιλής), ἀλλ᾿ ὁρᾶν εἴ πῃ καὶ πρὸς τὸ
ἦθος συντείνει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν. τοῦτο δ᾿ ἂν εἴη δῆλον, εἰ ποιοί τινες τὰ
ἤθη γιγνόμεθα δι᾿ αὐτῆς. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γιγνόμεθα ποιοί τινες, φανερὸν διὰ
πολλῶν μὲν καὶ ἑτέρων, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν ᾿Ολύμπου μελῶν· ταῦτα
γὰρ ὁμολογουμένως ποιεῖ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐνθουσιαστικάς, ὁ δ᾿ ἐνθουσιασμὸς τοῦ
περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἤθους πάθος ἐστίν.
[…] we ought not only to gain from it the common sort of pleasure, which
everyone has the capacity to perceive (since music dispenses pleasure of a nat-
ural kind, so that the use of it is beloved by all ages and characters), but ought
also to see whether it has a tendency to improve the character and the soul. We
would have proof of that, if we are caused by music to acquire specific quali-
ties in our characters. And indeed we do acquire specific qualities, as is shown
by many things, and especially by the melodies of Olympus: for it is generally
28 Plato, Laws 657b; translation Barker 1984, 145.
29 Cf. Philodemus, On music 4.2.15, quoting charac-
terisations of enharmonic and chromatic either as
solemn and noble, as opposed to unmanly and vul-
gar, or as harsh and despotic, as opposed to gentle.
After the classical era, when the enharmonic had
gone out of use, characteristics formerly ascribed to
it became associated typically with the diatonic.
98
shaping character
agreed that they inspire our souls with ecstasy (enthousiasmós), and ecstasy is a
qualification [pathos] of the character [êthos] of the soul.30
Just like Plato, Aristotle only deals briefly with harmoníai, recommending the Dorian,
among unspecified others, for common educational purposes, and omits a discussion
of rhythms altogether. Further details are left to specialists:
ἐπεὶ δὴ τὴν μὲν μουσικὴν ὁρῶμεν διὰ μελοποιίας καὶ ῥυθμῶν οὖσαν, τούτων
δ᾿ ἑκάτερον οὐ δεῖ λεληθέναι τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει πρὸς παιδείαν, καὶ πότερον
προαιρετέον μᾶλλον τὴν εὐμελῆ μουσικὴν ἢ τὴν εὔρυθμον, νομίσαντες οὖν
πολλὰ καλῶς λέγειν περὶ τούτων τῶν τε νῦν μουσικῶν ἐνίους καὶ τῶν ἐκ φιλο-
σοφίας ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ἐμπείρως ἔχοντες τῆς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν παιδείας,
τὴν μὲν καθ᾿ ἕκαστον ἀκριβολογίαν ἀποδώσομεν ζητεῖν τοῖς βουλομένοις παρ᾿
ἐκείνων, νῦν δὲ νομικῶς διέλωμεν, τοὺς τύπους μόνον εἰπόντες περὶ αὐτῶν.
We see that music consists in melodic composition and rhythms, and we must
neither forget the educative power that each of them has, nor neglect to ask
whethermusicwith goodmelody ormusicwith good rhythm is to be preferred.
Now since I believe that many excellent things have been said about these mat-
ters both by some contemporary musical experts and by those philosophers
who have been well acquainted with education in music, I shall hand over to
them the people who wish to pursue a precise account of every detail, and deal
with the issues only in general terms for the present, stating no more than their
outlines.31
[…] δέχεσθαι δὲ δεῖ κἄν τινα ἄλλην ἡμῖν δοκιμάζωσιν οἱ κοινωνοὶ τῆς ἐν φι-
λοσοφίᾳ διατριβῆς καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν παιδείας.
[…] and we should also accept other harmoniai if these are recommended to
us by our colleagues in the study of philosophy and in the musical aspects of
education.32
In respect of the Damonian question, it is noteworthy that Aristotle’s words display no
awareness of a past authority. The authoritative voices he has in mind seem primarily
to be contemporaries, both musicians and theorists. His own students Aristoxenus and
Theophrastus come to mind, who both published works on musical matters, the first
explicitly concerned with questions of ethos, the other emphasising the psychological
30 Aristotle, Politics 1339b–1340a; translation Barker
1984, 174–175.
31 Aristotle, Politics 1341b; translation Barker 1984,
179.
32 Aristotle, Politics 1342a; translation Barker 1984.
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aspects of music’s nature.33 On the other hand, we might also think about Plato, whose
views on the use of music as expressed in the Laws seem not very different from Aristo-
tle’s. In any case, the general reference to what he seems to envisage as a possible variety
of sources to be consulted, with different backgrounds, apparently precludes the pre-
dominance of a single account, and therefore the existence of a dominant systematic
evaluation of musical modes analogous to the model of Aristides.
Neither do we find any trace of such an idea in Aristoxenus, the most renowned
and most influential musical writer throughout antiquity. Although musically conser-
vative with rigorist traits, his general stance on musical ethos, as emerging from exten-
sive quotations in the pseudo-Plutarchan On Music,34 never sets out to evaluate musical
technicalities on an ontological basis. Quite to the contrary, the ability to pass adequate
musical judgment is presented as acquired by proper education (whichmakes the whole
point regrettably circular).
2 Conclusions
All in all, therefore, the three major exponents of 4th-century (musical) philosophy ap-
pear to agree that, as things stand, musical value is to be assessed by an experienced,
well-educated taste, there being neither automatable recipes like those offered by Aris-
tides nor quick shortcuts of the sort developed by Socrates andGlaucon on theRepublic’s
literary surface.
As we have seen, a critical assessment of the sources does not support the retro-
projection of Aristides’ ideas, or of anything similar, to the classical era. This is of course
not to say that the idea of musical ethos with its pedagogical and political implication
was not influential at that period, though it is difficult to see how far it was received out-
side elitist circles. At any rate, it was based on common experience, above all on the fact
that particularmelodies, modes and rhythmswould instantly invoke the emotional state
with which they had become associated through participation in communal activities,
ritual, military, sympotic or whatever. Ancient city states had their traditional songs
accompanying recurrent events, perhaps associated with a half-legendary musician of
the remote past, and newly founded ones might associate themselves with outstanding
composers also of a more recent past.35 The ensuing intimate connection between an
established city’s constitution and music of a more archaic hue, in contrast to ongoing
musical development fuelled by constant competition between living poet-performers,
33 On Theophrastus’ views cf. Barker 2007, 411–436.
34 Cf. Barker 2007, 233–259.
35 Cf. e. g. pseudo-Plutarch, On music 1134b; Scholion
to Odyssey 3.267; Pausanias 4.27.7.
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could quite naturally load politically conservative discourse withmusical overtones. An-
other factor being national pride and an emerging ‘European’ self-awareness in the pro-
longed aftermath of the Persian wars, we generally find that the elements of music re-
jected by conservative writers are generally those which are regarded as recent or carry
foreign associations: the Lydian and Phrygian harmoníai in contrast to the Dorian,36 or
the chromatic genus, which probably evolved along with modulating instruments. In
that way, ancient musical ethics before Aristides, wherever going beyond most general
statements, was unable to transcend the level of a mere self-assertion of culturally ac-
quired taste. Aristides, on the other hand, provides but the late proof of how poor any
elaborated system would have looked, justifying the wise restraint of earlier philoso-
phers.




Warren D. Anderson. “The Importance of Damo-
nian Theory in Plato’s thought”. Transactions and
Proceedings of the American Philological Association 86
(1955), 88–102.
Barker 1984
Andrew Barker. Greek Musical Writings I. The Musi-
cian and his Art. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1984.
Barker 1989
Andrew Barker. Greek Musical Writings II. Harmonic
and Acoustic Theory. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1989.
Barker 2007
Andrew Barker. The Science of Harmonics in Classical
Greece. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007.
Hagel 2009a
Stefan Hagel. Ancient Greek Music: A New Technical
History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2009.
Hagel 2009b
Stefan Hagel. “Reconstructing the Hellenistic Pro-
fessional Aulos”. In La Musa dimenticata. Aspetti
dell’esperienza musicale greca in età ellenistica. Ed. by
M. C. Martinelli. Pisa: Edizioni della Normale,
2009, 227–246.
Halliwell 2006
Francis Stephen Halliwell. “An Aristotelian Per-
spective on Plato’s Dialogues”. In New Essays on
Plato: Language and Thought in Fourth-Century Greek
Philosophy. Ed. by F. Herrmann. Swansea: Classical
Press of Wales, 2006, 189–211.
Liddell, Scott and Jones 1996
Henry G. Liddell, Robert Scott and Henry S.
Jones. A Greek-English Lexicon. Vol. 9th ed. with
Revised Supplement. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1996.
Lynch 2013
Tosca Lynch. “A Sophist ‘in Disguise’: A Recon-
struction of Damon of Oa and His Role in Plato’s




Rudolf Schäfke. Aristeides Quintilianus. Von der
Musik. Berlin: M. Hesse, 1937.
Wallace 1991
Robert Wallace. “Damone di Oa ed i suoi suc-
cessori”. In Harmonia Mundi: Music and Philosophy
in the Ancient World. Ed. by R. W. Wallace and
B. MacLachlan. Rome: Edizioni dell’Ateneo,
1991, 30–54.
Wallace 2005
Robert Wallace. “Performing Damon’s harmoníai”.
In Ancient Greek Music in Performance. Ed. by S.
Hagel and Ch. Harrauer. Vienna: Verlag der
Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften,
2005, 147–157.
West 1992





works as senior researcher at the Austrian Academy
of Sciences, focusing on ancient music, music the-
ory, and its relation to musical practice, musical
instruments, as well as questions of rhythm. His
work involves reconstruction of instruments and
playing techniques, which have frequently been
demonstrated to an international public in form of
lecture-concerts. Characteristic of Hagel’s research
is an extensive application of computer techniques
and mathematical methods.
Dr. Stefan Hagel
Institute for the Study of Ancient Culture
Austrian Academy of Sciences
Hollandstraße 11–13
1020 Vienna, Austria
E-Mail: stefan.hagel@oeaw.ac.at
103

